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Abstract 
 
Contrary to some previous assumptions, the enlargement did not 
halt the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decision-
making process in a substantial way. Rather it changed the 
dynamics within the working environment, preserving the 
importance of consensus-building practices in the Council working 
groups. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it tracks the 
changes that the recent enlargement caused in the working 
practices of the Council working groups. It also attempts to assess 
the adaptation processes of the new member states to the work in 
the Council working groups and pinpoint the main challenges that 
their administrative systems were faced with. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The prospect of the European Union’s (EU) Eastern enlargement 
sparked an intense debate on the formal institutional arrangements 
and the ways to accommodate ten new member states. The fact that 
they would join the negotiating table with different experiences, 
administrative backgrounds and interests, while the unanimity rule 
remained in place, was considered by some as a recipe for a 
stalemate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Looking at the existing institutional arrangements, some authors 
pointed at enlargement as a potential threat to efficient decision-
making process (Nugent 2003: 503; Sjursen 1998). Fears about a 
deadlock were amplified with the rift between the “new” and the 
“old” Europe over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This argument has 
often been used to support subsequent reforms in the EU’s external 
action, and in particular, with the new Constitutional Treaty. 
However, as this article argues, formal institutional arrangements 
are not enough to explain the conduct of the EU’s foreign policy. 
Informal practices have to be put into the picture if one wants to 
make sense of CFSP governance. Only in this way can the impact 
of enlargement be adequately assessed.  
 
The majority of the literature referring to the impact of enlargement 
has mainly focused on policy substance, whereas issues of 
governance have remained unexplored (Cameron and Primatarova 
2003; Duke 2003; Edwards 2005; Neuhold 2003). Other analyses 
have concentrated on the Europeanisation of national foreign 
policies of the individual states.
1 In the case of the CFSP 
governance system, most attention was given to possible 
institutional reforms in the light of the forthcoming enlargement 
during the meetings of the European Convention (e.g. Cameron, and 
Primatarova 2003). What is still lacking is an attempt to examine 
the overall impact of the 2004 enlargement on the CFSP policy-
making process.  
 
This article analyses CSFP committee governance, by focusing on 
the lower level of decision-making: the Council working groups. 
Their importance in the process of governance in the area of the 
                                                 
1  For some of the analysis see: CFSP Forum (2005) vol. 3, no. 3. 6  European Political Economy Review  
   
CFSP has thus far been underestimated. Even though the ‘high 
politics’ images associated with the CFSP may suggest that hard 
bargaining at higher levels is the main decision-making procedure, 
our empirical research shows the increasing importance of 
consensus building practices and highlights the role of experts. A 
large number of issues reach the Committee of Representatives 
(COREPER) or the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the 
form of already agreed consensus.
2 The enlargement has increased 
the workload at the level of the Council working groups since with 
more participants around the table there is less time for discussions 
at other levels such as the PSC, COREPER and the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC).  
 
Taking up the central argument of this volume regarding the impact 
of enlargement on committee governance this article reflects on 
how enlargement might have affected, first, the role of the CFSP 
committees in the overall decision-making process, second, the 
different modes of CFSP committee governance (consensus-
building vs. bargaining), and third, the adaptation of the new 
member states to the CFSP committee governance, not only 
regarding procedural practices, but also reorganising national 
administrations. In order to do this, the article tracks the changes 
that the recent enlargement caused in the practices of the 
COREPER II working groups in the Council of the EU. It also 
attempts to assess the adaptation processes of the new member 
states to the procedural rules in the Council working groups and 
pinpoint the main challenges that their administrative systems and 
diplomacies were faced with.  
 
The article begins with a short explanation of the CFSP decision-
making procedures and the distinctive aspects of the second pillar in 
relation to community policies. It also underlines the first 
administrative changes relating to the period prior to accession. 
Then it proceeds with identifying certain ‘codes of conduct’-such as 
                                                 
2 A large part of the Council workload is already agreed at the level of the 
Council working groups and it reaches the PSC and/or COREPER II as A points 
in the agenda. Approximately 70 per cent of the total items in the GAERC agenda 
has been previously agreed in the prior Council working group and 15-20 per cent 
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the consensus building or the coordination reflex. Even though 
unanimity still remains the major CFSP decision-making rule, 
meetings take neither longer nor is there a reduction in the output of 
the meetings (agreed decisions). As several practitioners have 
noted, this may be due to the fact that some of the previous 
practices have been reinforced. For example, there has been an 
increase in informal cooperation and coalition-building, so that 
issues often appear ‘pre-cooked’ on the agenda. This article will 
examine changes in informal rules in the Council working groups 
after the enlargement in detail, and support our observations in this 
area supported with new evidence. The last section refers to the 
adaptational changes of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) of 
the new member states. The empirical evidence points to some 
tensions between the capitals and Brussels as there are different 
perceptions of how negotiations should take place, with the capitals 
still having problems in recognizing the value of informal 
procedures. Other problems encountered during the process of 
adaptation refer to the lack of resources (both human and material), 
coordination mechanisms and organisational culture.  
 
The article refers to the process of socialisation, which plays a 
crucial role in the process of adaptation of the newcomers to EU 
membership. In sociological accounts, socialisation is usually 
linked to the establishment of a ‘we-feeling’, which in turn, may 
eventually lead to the emergence of a common identity (Deutsch, 
1957: 5-7). This would mean that the values and norms would be 
internalised or ‘taken for granted’ (Johnston, 2001: 495) and the 
actors would behave according to the logic of appropriateness. 
However, such conceptualisation of socialisation does not explain 
different types of internalisation of norms and the role played by 
rationality in this process. As acknowledged in the recent literature 
on socialisation (Checkel 2005), compliance with the rules of the 
group may result from different processes, namely, role playing, 
normative suasion or strategic calculation and it does not 
necessarily imply the internalisation of norms. 
 
The approach adopted in this study builds on the latter approach. In 
the case of the Council working groups, where there is still lack of 
evidence of internalisation of norms, strategic factors can better 
explain compliance with the practices of the group. The concept of 8  European Political Economy Review  
   
socialisation is therefore limited to adoption of certain rules of 
behaviour, ‘ways of doing things’, stemming from interaction with 
members of the same group. This does not imply that actors (here 
diplomats from the new member states) internalise certain norms, 
even though this possibility is not excluded in a long-time 
perspective. Instead, they act strategically, taking into account the 
social and normative context in which they are embedded (Juncos 
and Pomorska, 2006).
3  
 
The article is based on more than 30 in-depth interviews with 
national representatives to the Council working groups and EU 
officials (Commission and the Council Secretariat General) in 2005 
and early 2006.
4 Overall, the empirical research included interviews 
with diplomats from 20 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. Based on this extensive evidence, the article illustrates 
the self-perception of officials and diplomats and their opinion on 
the impact of enlargement. The evidence is complemented by 
participant observation in the Council working groups meetings in 
2005 and secondary literature.  
 
Even though some social scientists may be critical towards 
qualitative research methods, especially because they are not 
replicable and it is difficult to generalise from them (Devine, 2002: 
204), here they are considered as a very valuable technique for 
several reasons. Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewees 
to speak at length and for themselves about how decision-making 
takes place in Brussels. Therefore, elite interviews constitute a 
flexible technique to explore the interviewees’ attitudes, 
motivations and perceptions. Ideas of consensus-building, trust or 
credibility are phenomena that cannot be grasped adequately by 
quantitative measures. In any case, what is important is how these 
phenomena are perceived and interpreted by policy-makers in order 
                                                 
3 Such perception of actors reflecting on the social context was also adopted in 
other studies such as Beyers, 2005 or Schimmelfennig, 2000. 
4 Both authors would like to express their gratitude for the kind assistance they 
were given by national representatives, as well as the EU officials, during their 
fieldwork. Unless indicated otherwise, all the quotations in this article come from 
the interviews conducted by the authors. Juncos and Pomorska: The deadlock that never happened 9   
to better identify the impact of socialisation processes within the 
Council working groups.  
 
 
2.  The CFSP governance and the Council Working Groups 
 
Even though the CFSP operates within the same institutional 
framework as other EU policies, it has its own decision-making 
procedures, which explains the way in which adaptation takes place 
in this area. The CFSP is an intergovernmental policy with states 
holding veto power. This emphasises the significance of the 
national officials, who operate at both the European and the national 
level, providing a link between the two. Secondly, there is no clear 
template of policies to which the member state should adapt. For 
example, even though the member states have to align to CFSP 
decisions, there are no specific provisions about how to implement 
them, which explains why divergence persists between the national 
foreign policies. Furthermore, the CFSP is characterised by a lack 
of strong legal pressure and the European Court of Justice does not 
have any prerogatives in this policy field. Therefore, adaptation is 
expected to be voluntary, rather than coercive, with an emphasis on 
the informal channels of change.
5 This feature is similar to what 
happens in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and in the 
Economic and Monetary Union, described by Uwe Puetter as 
“coordination among independent actors” (2003: 110).
6   
 
Finally, the main difficulty in adapting to the CFSP is that it 
constitutes a ‘moving target’, as the EU is undergoing dynamic 
changes in this field. The changes in its institutional setting have 
gained speed in recent years, initiated by the establishment of the 
CFSP as the second EU pillar by the Treaty of Maastricht, and later 
with other important innovations in the Treaties of Amsterdam and 
Nice. The pace has been particularly rapid in the European Security 
                                                 
5 With the exception of the period prior to accession when conditionality plays a 
more important role, this is also the case in the area of foreign policy. 
6 In the case of the Economic and Monetary Union, the predominant mode of 
interaction among actors has been called “deliberative intergovernmentalism” by 
Puetter (2003). 10  European Political Economy Review  
   
and Defence Policy (ESDP), launched at the St. Malo summit in 
1998. 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht formalised the co-ordinating structures 
that had sustained the European Political Cooperation (EPC) since 
the 1970s, without altering its basic intergovernmental nature. In 
other words, unanimity is still the rule in the CFSP; qualified 
majority the exception. The member states retain a veto power in 
the CFSP and dominate the decision-making process; however, the 
national MFAs have been increasingly displaced from the core of 
the decision-making process by the intergovernmental bodies 
located in Brussels through the so-called process of “Brusselisation” 
(Allen, 1998). Among these bodies, the PSC is responsible for 
preparing CFSP issues for the Council, monitors the international 
situation regarding CFSP and helps to define policies and strategies 
in these areas. It also holds the main responsibility for the control of 
EU crisis management operations. Another body involved in the 
decision-making process, preparing the decisions for the Council, is 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives, better known as 
COREPER. In fact, it is more accurate to talk about two formations 
within COREPER: COREPER I, dealing mainly with EC issues, 
and COREPER II dealing with external relations, the financial 
perspective and Justice and Home Affairs. The first is composed by 
deputy ambassadors, and the second by permanent representatives, 
with the status of ambassadors.  
 
With the Treaty of Maastricht, the former EPC Working Parties 
were merged with their community counterparts although some 
CFSP-specific working groups remained. The Council working 
groups are composed by national representatives based in the 
Permanent Representations in Brussels
7 and their role is to discuss 
and draft CFSP documents (Joint Actions, Council Conclusions, 
Action Plans). There are thirty-six CFSP working groups that have 
been set following thematic (Transatlantic Relations, Non-
Proliferation, Human Rights) or geographical lines (Western 
Balkans, EFTA, Latin America). With the development of the 
ESDP, two committees have been established, dealing with the 
                                                 
7 Having said that, it is worth noting that the Council working Council working 
groups also meet in ‘capital formations’ composed by directors from the MFAs. Juncos and Pomorska: The deadlock that never happened 11   
military (EU Military Committee or EUMC) and the civilian 
aspects of the EU’s crisis management policies (Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management or CIVCOM). 
 
 
3.  Enlargement and foreign policy 
 
In this section, some aspects of the adaptation prior to enlargement 
are discussed. The EU used the policy of conditionality towards the 
candidate countries. Its main logic was to exert pressure so that the 
candidates would comply with the entry conditions, while their 
motivation to do so was provided by the prospect of membership. 
The same logic of conditionality was applied in the case of CFSP, 
although in this policy area, no specific legal adaptation of the EU 
law into the national law was necessary, as the CFSP does not 
operate with the same legal instruments as pillar I, such as 
directives or regulations.
8 Instead, it is equipped with instruments 
like common declarations, positions, statements and joint actions. 
Hence, the candidate states were obliged to accept, the so called, 
acquis politique, and ensure that their national foreign policies were 
in compliance with the positions expressed by the EU member 
states within the framework of the CFSP. Overall, this process was 
not problematic. Unlike in the case of the previous enlargement 
involving Austria, Finland and Sweden, none of the current 
newcomers had problems with combining neutrality or non-alliance 
with joining the EU (Neuhold 2003: 1).
9  
 
The first adaptational changes in the foreign policies of the new 
member states were related to the establishment of a structural 
dialogue between the candidates and the EU. During the summer of 
1994, the Associated European Correspondents were nominated 
(Dunay et al. 1997: 325) and meetings were held at the ministerial 
level and between Political Directors and European Correspondents 
with the Associated European Correspondents. Some countries also 
                                                 
8 In relation to the CFSP, however, various forms of adaptation in external 
relations were needed, for instance, in order to formally be able to execute 
sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by the EU. 
9  However, it has to be noted that Cyprus and Malta are not fully participating in 
the ESDP issues that involved Berlin Plus arrangements since they are not NATO 
members. 12  European Political Economy Review  
   
needed to create the post of the Political Director or, if it existed, 
adjust his/her competences. GAERC would invite the Foreign 
Ministers of Associated States to its meetings and similarly the 
Political Committee arranged meetings with the Political Directors. 
A former Polish Associated European Correspondent, who attended 
the meetings, recalled a very particular atmosphere. The difference 
between the EU insiders and the candidates was very apparent, even 
though the presidency was making an effort to bridge this gap. The 
15 old European Correspondents knew each other - in most cases 
also privately. According to the diplomat, they were not interested 
into engaging in any real discussion and the formula simply “did 
not work”. The representatives from the new member states were 
also invited, once during the term of each presidency, to participate 
in the working groups meetings. However, usually the EU was 
represented just by the Troika with the officials from the Council 
Secretariat General and the Commission (ibid: 326). In practice, 
most such meetings in the beginning of the structural dialogue were 
merely “presenting monologues on both sides without actually 
reacting on each other’s positions” (ibid.). In this light, such 
occasional meetings caused some organisational changes, but did 
not present much opportunity for socialisation between the 
diplomats. 
 
The candidates were also given the possibility to align with some of 
the CFSP declarations agreed by the Fifteen, adhere to démarches 
or participate in joint actions.
10 In practical terms, the electronic 
communication system ACN (Associated Countries Network) was 
installed in the MFAs. Through this system the Council Secretariat 
sent the questions to the Accession States inquiring whether they 
wished to align with certain EU positions, declarations and actions. 
The frequency varied from a few daily questions, to just one every 
couple of days. Since they became active observers,
11 they gained a 
full access to the CORTESY network,
12 which for some proved a 
shocking experience, regarding the great increase in the amount of 
                                                 
10 For data on alignments in the period 1995-2002, see Regelsberger 2002. 
11 After signing the Treaty of Accession on the 16 April 2003, the candidate states 
obtained the status of active observers. 
12 CORTESY is the telex system that enables communication among the MFAs of 
the EU member states, the Commission and Council Secretariat. COREUs are the 
single messages sent out.   Juncos and Pomorska: The deadlock that never happened 13   
information received from the European partners. To distribute and 
coordinate all this information, the MFAs needed additional staff 
and new coordination mechanisms.  
 
Becoming active observers allowed the candidate states to take part 
in the meetings related to the CFSP and ESDP, such as the Council 
working groups, COREPER II and PSC. Nonetheless, even the 
larger states among the candidates, like Poland, did not attend all 
the meetings from the beginning. This was mainly due to the lack of 
experts in the Permanent Representation, but also to a lack of 
interest on the part of the various ministerial departments in 
attending those meetings. Soon, the numbers of people employed in 
the Permanent Representations increased dramatically and new 
coordination mechanisms were introduced in order to adjust the 
rhythm of work to the EU agendas. Another problem to adaptation 
was that some of the new member states did not have much of a 
tradition in foreign-policy making, as they were newly independent 
states. This applied in particular to the Baltic states, as former 
Soviet Republics, as well as to Slovenia and Slovakia. As a 
diplomat from one of these states admits: “one big problem is 
historical memory in the organisation, [and we are] starting from 
zero”. These countries had to build their administrations, almost at 
the same time that they were conducting the negotiations and 
preparing for EU membership. To this day, some smaller member 
states express their concerns that more staff is required in order to 
effectively cover all the Council working groups. 
 
 
4.  Ending, changing or adapting to the ‘Brussels game’? 
 
As shown by our research, the formal rules, i.e. those established in 
the Council’s rules of procedure or in the Treaties, were grasped 
quite quickly by the newcomers. What was more challenging was 
first defining and then adjusting to the informal rules and practices, 
since the adoption of these informal norms involved learning and 
socialisation processes. As one EU official claimed: “the new 
countries have not yet absorbed whatever it is, but it takes time, you 
cannot just appear, read the three little books on the rules of the 
Council”. To a large degree, informal practices define the work of 
diplomats in the working group and may explain why the 14  European Political Economy Review  
   
enlargement did not produce a stalemate, in spite of the fact that the 
formal rule of procedure remained the same. In this part of the 
article, the main elements of the behavioural code of conduct in the 
CFSP working groups are identified. In order to examine the impact 
of enlargement on the Council working groups every-day work, the 
adaptation to each of them is analysed separately. This is done 
while bearing in mind two discreet dimensions: the impact on the 
rule (whether it changed or not after the enlargement) and the 
ability of the newcomers to apply it in their behaviour. The 
following sections outline the every-day practices that have been 
identified as part of the ‘Brussels game’: 
 
4.1 Coordination  reflex 
 
Early analyses of European foreign policy mentioned the emergence 
of a “reflex coordination” among national diplomats (de 
Schouthetee 1980; Nuttall 1992; Smith, 2004, Tonra 2001). This 
may be defined as a common practice of information-sharing, 
before any decisions are taken and often before even the formal 
national position is formulated. This practice is observed in the 
increase in communicative practices among CFSP officials. These 
take place through formal channels, such as CORTESY or mailing 
lists of the working groups, but also informally. Informal contacts 
are maintained through the usual channels of e-mails, mobile 
phones calls and frequent meetings with other colleagues in the 
corridors and ‘over lunch’. The increase in communicative practices 
among national representatives highlights the fact that the EU 
member states no longer feel threatened by sharing information 
with their European colleagues. As mentioned by Hill and Wallace 
(1996: 12), current exchanges of information among national 
representatives include, among others things the “exchange of 
confidential information not only about third countries but also 
about their own governments’ intentions and domestic constraints, 
the sharing of tasks (and sometimes facilities) in third countries, the 
acceptance of officials on secondment to their home ministry as no 
longer ‘foreign’ but colleagues”. Furthermore, some more sensitive 
information is also shared among the states, in special 
circumstances. The information-sharing practice bears special 
significance for the smaller member states, for whom the EU and its 
member states become an important source of information.  Juncos and Pomorska: The deadlock that never happened 15   
 
The density and frequency of information exchanged in Brussels 
and between the capitals and embassies of the member states has 
increased after the enlargement. The new member states soon 
realised the importance of these communicative practices.
13 
However, it took some time for them to learn how to use the 
communication channels and take full advantage of the informal 
consultations. The COREU network was not always used in the 
right way. Either the information sent was irrelevant, too long, or 
formulated in a manner that was not in line with informal rules, like 
not including names of states invited to join the proposal, so as not 
to exclude anyone. Similar problems concerned the non-papers and 
other circulated position papers. 
 
Some representatives argued that more negotiations than before 
were taking place informally, outside of the negotiation rooms. As 
one representative from a new member state claimed: “I believe that 
90% of issues are resolved in the corridors”. As a result of the 
enlargement, the working environment became “very complex”. 
This was arguably a result of having more actors around the table, 
so it became impossible to have a personal working relationship 
with everyone. As there is often not enough time during the formal 
meetings to explain the motivations behind certain positions, 
informal contact beforehand becomes indispensable. At the same 
time, there is a common understanding that interventions need to be 
shorter and more focused. In sum, according to one diplomat: 
“much more of the negotiations take place outside the meetings and 
[…] the formal meetings have become just the place where you 
finalise the discussions.”  Nonetheless, as one experienced diplomat 
from an old member state explained, the new member states 
sometimes tend to overestimate the informal ways of doing things 
and remain quiet during the working group’ meetings, which, he 
argued, is a mistake.  
 
Due to this increasing complexity, many issues on the agenda need 
to be ‘pre-cooked’ in order to increase the effectiveness of the 
group. Arguably, there was an increase in meetings of the so-called 
                                                 
13 Similarly, diplomats from the new member states’ embassies in third countries 
started to consult their counterparts in regular EU-25 meetings (Khol 2005). 16  European Political Economy Review  
   
‘like-minded groups’, in which the biggest new member states soon 
found their place. Sometimes these groups would prepare common 
amendments and discuss the strategy for the meeting, including the 
order of taking the floor. Like-minded groups operate on a very 
informal basis and usually participants credit each other with trust. 
Interestingly, some Polish diplomats claimed to be the “link” 
between the largest old member states and the smaller newcomers, 
who would sometimes be excluded from the informal negotiations. 
On the other hand, as one of the diplomats pointed out, such 
intensive cooperation within the like-minded groups could 
eventually become a threat to the overall cohesion and socialisation 
dynamics within the working group.  
 
The coordination reflex also implies a tendency to take others’ 
views into account when formulating national positions. Thus, the 
impact of this practice is also felt in the capitals of the new member 
states. The diplomats seconded to Brussels have continuously tried 
to convince their MFAs that national positions needed to take other 
member states’ views into account, and to be less radical if they 
wanted to reach consensus and get their position reflected in the 
final outcome. To achieve this, better communication structures 
between the capitals and Brussels are still required to increase the 
degree of flexibility during the negotiations. For example, they need 
to be in permanent contact by phone with their capitals during the 
actual meetings in order to be able to adjust their instructions. 
Representatives in Brussels also need to be credited with trust and 
confidence from their MFAs, what is not always the case, so they 
can have some room for manoeuvre to arrange deals within the 
consensus. All of this requires changes in the highly centralized 
ministerial systems. 
 
4.2 Consensus  building 
 
Another code of conduct that has been identified in the CFSP 
literature is the consensus building practice, i.e. a tendency to adopt 
decisions based on a wide consensus among member states (Tonra 
2001; Lewis 2005). The fact that the CFSP is subject to 
intergovernmental bargaining with states retaining their veto 
powers, with few exceptions, may suggest that hard bargaining and 
the threat of the veto dominate CFSP negotiations. By contrast, the Juncos and Pomorska: The deadlock that never happened 17   
empirical research has shown that there is a general practice to keep 
everyone on-board and a very strong impulse to reach a 
compromise amongst the representatives to the Council working 
groups. Acting unilaterally during the negotiations is often not very 
well received and isolation is avoided by everyone in the working 
groups, especially by those representatives from small or medium 
size member states. This picture at the micro-level might somehow 
differ from well documented examples of disagreements amongst 
the member states on foreign policy issues such as those during the 
Iraq crisis in 2003. Arguably, these are the exceptions that confirm 
the rule and in many of these cases discussions are kept consciously 
out of the Brussels-based bodies by the member states because of 
the sensitivity carried by these issues. However, as it will be 
mentioned later, the scope of these domaines réservés is gradually 
contracting.  
 
The negotiation environment in the Council working groups 
predetermines the balance between three different modes of 
interaction characteristic to actors in such a negotiation setting: 
deliberation, information exchange and bargaining (Puetter 2003). 
First of all, contrary to high level bodies (e.g. COREPER or the 
Eurogroup), negotiations in the Council working groups are less 
secretive. This results in fewer opportunities for deliberations in the 
formal meetings and more bargaining/information-type discussions. 
Secondly, the fact that the experts are accountable to their principals 
limits their room for manoeuvre and chances for deliberation. Time 
and overloaded agendas generates pressure on the representatives 
for bargaining in formal meetings. 
 
The 2004 enlargement was often perceived as endangering the 
consensus-building practice since it would increase the 
heterogeneity in the EU’s membership (Cameron and Primatarova 
2003; Duke 2003; Nugent 2003). In other words, “logic would 
suggest that the CFSP will become more ineffective after the 
Eastern enlargement, and that it might even be brought to a 
complete standstill. The struggle to identify shared interests in 
foreign policy will be even more complicated at twenty or twenty-
five than at fifteen” (Sjursen 1998: 11). In fact, the last enlargement 
has brought new sensitivities to the CFSP and modified the balance 18  European Political Economy Review  
   
of interests regarding some issues/geographical areas;
14 yet, the 
impact of enlargement has been uneven throughout the different 
CFSP working groups. In some, the incorporation of ten new 
member states has not had a significant impact on the discussions 
and did not increase the number of intervening actors. For example, 
this has been the case in CIVCOM, dealing with civilian crisis 
management. The newcomers often do not speak during the 
meetings, either because they have no instructions or because they 
do not have the relevant expertise.
15 In other cases, the enlargement 
has altered the status quo or the balance between the member states. 
Thus, in the EU Military Committee and the working group on 
Transatlantic Relations, the enlargement has not changed the divide 
between Atlanticists (supportive of the strengthening of NATO) and 
Europeanists (pro an autonomous defence capacity). Nonetheless, it 
has increased the weight of the former, since most of the new 
member states have expressed the need to maintain a close 
relationship with the US. As one national diplomat put it: “The new 
member states feel very strongly that their national security depends 
on NATO. Therefore, with the enlargement there has been an 
increase in the weight of NATO in the ESDP”.
16  
 
In other cases, the enlargement has introduced new interests. This 
has been the case in the working group on Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (COEST), and particularly as regards the EU’s policies 
towards Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, since some of them share 
borders with these countries. Most of the new member states are 
very active in COEST since they perceive it as one of the highest 
priorities within their activities in the EU. The balance of the group 
has naturally changed, as well as the discourse within it.
17 Some of 
                                                 
14 For a review of different interests brought to the CFSP negotiating table by the 
New member states, see Edwards 2005 and Cameron and Primatarova 2003: 6-
10. 
15 In general, and because most of them are small member states, they simply 
made small contributions in terms of capabilities to the EU civilian crisis 
management operations.  
16  This has not prevented however the operational and institutional development 
of the ESDP and since 2003, sixteen ESDP operations have been launched with 
the endorsement of the new member states.  
17 Some even mentioned that with the enlargement, polarisation within COEST 
has increased as the pro-Russian members of the group have established a more 
structured co-operation among them.  Juncos and Pomorska: The deadlock that never happened 19   
the new member states, in particular, Poland and the Baltic States 
have often been accused of being anti-Russian. Other interviewees 
stressed the fact that these new member states would have brought a 
“new realism” in the policies towards this region. According to 
another diplomat: “the balance has changed after the enlargement 
(…) there is a clear divide at the Council meetings into the new and 
old Europe”. This suggests that they have changed the dynamics 
within the group, although another question might ask what their 
impact on the policy substance has actually been (see below).    
 
In spite of the increasing in the number of actors and the broadening 
of the range of interests, according to the interviewees, the 
consensus atmosphere is still evident in the meeting room in general 
terms. Levels of conflict had not augmented or at least not 
substantially, and the degree of effectiveness of the group, 
understood as the ability to reach agreements, also remained 
invariable. Even more than before, a readiness for compromise is 
required. As one practitioner mentioned: “the fact that we are 
twenty five now obliges everyone to refrain from being too 
restrictive on specific issues, more than before”. The increasing 
number of the informal negotiations, as shown in the previous 
section, might have helped to overcome potential deadlocks, and the 
new member states have also gradually learnt how to better present 
their strategies, so as not to endanger the consensus atmosphere.  
 
As regards the adaptation process undergone by the representatives 
from the new member states, it arguably all comes down to learning 
a new negotiating strategy, one that allows reconciling consensus 
and national interest. The first thing they had to learn is to present 
their instructions in a less aggressive manner. Radical positions are 
often condemned through ostracism - that is, being perceived as a 
radical within the group is a losing strategy. As one EU official 
claimed: “I still think there is a learning period going on and the 
new member states will learn that sometimes they should present 
their position in a less radical manner, that they will gain from that”. 
This has been slowly realised by the new member states 
representatives in Brussels. As some diplomats noticed, there has 
been a change in the behaviour and language that the new 
representatives used in the Council, with them becoming more 
pragmatic and ready to negotiate. Referring to changes observed in 20  European Political Economy Review  
   
their behaviour, an EU official commented that the new member 
states representatives “speak now differently than they did one year 
ago. They make things softer, they have gained some confidence 
and friendship with other colleagues so they feel confident to 
present things less radically than their capitals might wish, but in 
the end they get more results”. This is arguably a result of the 
socialisation process that the national representatives from the new 
member states are subjected to in the Council. 
 
However, it is true, that in the first stages of the adaptation process, 
the new member states were not always aware of this consensus-
building practice and on some occasions they concentrated their 
energies on their national positions without reflecting on the need 
for compromise, or without taking into account the general 
atmosphere within the group. This might not necessary indicate that 
the old member states do not fight for their interests, but arguably, 
that they do it in a different manner. For instance, Finland’s more 
pragmatic approach towards Russia, engaging others in its 
proposals for partnerships on environment or development, have 
been more successful than those of the Baltic countries or Poland.  
 
Once they adapt to the code of conduct, a second phase in the 
adaptation process will require the representative from new member 
states to learn how to better use this strategy to make an actual 
impact on the agenda-setting and the policy substance. In general, 
because of the lack of resources and the fact that most of the new 
member states are small states, they have tended to prioritize some 
areas over others in order to maximize results.
18 Moreover, 
according to some interviewees, the new member states have been 
repeatedly acting as a bloc, even when it was not the highest issue at 
stake for some of them. This strategy was not well perceived by the 
representatives from the old member states, who only resort to this 
strategy on rare occasions. Some also questioned whether 
                                                 
18 For example, the Baltic countries have focused on the Eastern dimension, 
Hungary and Slovenia on the Balkans, and Malta and Cyprus on the 
Mediterranean.  Surprisingly, in the case of the Czechs, they have added two 
areas of special interests to its traditional foreign policy: the Middle East Peace 
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portraying themselves as a new bloc was indeed profitable and 
useful at all.  
 
Having said that, the consensus-building practice does not mean 
that the member states have to relinquish their national interests. In 
special circumstances, where there is a vital interest, other member 
states ‘understand’ a member state’s right to veto the decision or to 
ask for amendments to be made.
19 Both old and new member states 
resort to this practice. However, even in those situations, a crucial 
question refers to the way in which the member state that is vetoing 
a decision frames its claims. Those countries that succeed in putting 
their demands in ‘EU terms’ are usually more successful in 
achieving them. However, the new member states are still in the 
process of learning how to put this into practice. The case of Cyprus 
vetoing the EU Action Plan for Azerbaijan due to bilateral tensions, 
has been mentioned by some EU officials as an example of a failed 
strategy to block an issue based on national grounds. Therefore, 
more changes are needed, both in terms of practices, but also 
discourse.  
 
It seems that the new member states have been successful in 
including new items in the agenda, in particular, in those Council 
working groups where they have ‘special’ interests, such as 
COEST. For example, one national representative pointed to the 
fact that issues like Ukraine have mounted to the top of the agenda: 
“one year and a half ago Ukraine was discussed once a month […] 
There has been a change, a quantitative change, but a qualitative 
one too… [there are] more discussions, people [from the new 
member states] now these countries, they have experience, more 
than the old member states do”. In order to bring their special 
interests into the agenda more successfully, the new member states 
have increasingly tried to follow a consensus-oriented approach, 
rather than a confrontational one, although there are still some 
exceptions. Yet, it is not clear what the impact on the policy 
substance has been, since the EU policies in this region have not 
dramatically changed after the enlargement in 2004. There are, 
                                                 
19 As pointed by some interviewees, the member status cannot resort to this 
strategy too often, but only in “extreme circumstances”, when a very important 
issue is at stake, otherwise they will loose their credibility within the group. 22  European Political Economy Review  
   
however, some minor changes. Some diplomats mentioned the 
example of the EU’s involvement in the Orange Revolution that 
was encouraged by the Poles and the Lithuanians. Another 
representative from the Political-Military working group pointed to 
the fact that the new member states have also made a positive 
contribution by bringing in their know-how in the security sector 
reform or human rights. But, as several diplomats have stressed, the 
impact of the new member states on this and other issues could be 
much higher than it is actually the case. Often, this is due to the fact 
that they are still very much in the learning phase. As one official 
from a new member state argued: “we are still in the transition 
process, the new member states must still learn how the system is 
working to use it more efficiently; less rhetoric and national request 
but more influence, more realism”. 
 
4.3 Consistency 
 
Another important principle is that of maintaining vertical and 
horizontal consistency. This means endeavouring to avoid 
contradicting the position taken earlier on a higher level once it 
reaches the Council working group, and not opening up issues 
within a more senior political forum that have been previously 
agreed at a lower level. Finally, it also implies being aware of not 
contradicting the positions of different forums. Breaking this rule 
was considered a “clear breach of procedures” by one diplomat, 
whereas another one claimed that such behaviour is not only “badly 
perceived”, but for the others “it seems that you are not serious, that 
your system does not work”. With the arrival of the ten new 
member states, the fear was that, if this rule were not respected, 
there would be chaos in the decision-making process, as issues 
previously closed could be re-opened at higher levels. In general, 
however, it seems that the newcomers identified this rule (the 
observation period helped in this regard), and that it was usually 
applied. On some occasions, respecting this practice proved to be a 
challenge for the new member states. Its breaching, however, 
mostly resulted from the lack of efficient coordination mechanisms 
or insufficient knowledge on the past CFSP dossiers. 
 
The issue of consistency is closely related to understanding the role 
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decision-making in the capitals. In the beginning, the level of 
experts tended to be underestimated by the new member states. As 
one voice from the capital put it: “we will obviously not discuss it at 
such a low level”. Instead various issues were considered for re-
opening at the higher levels. Sometimes also the high-level officials 
or politicians had their own vision of the policy lines, which was 
contradictory to the one presented at the experts’ level. This has 
changed over time and there is improved coordination between the 
different bodies. What seems clear from the empirical research is 
that in most cases the inconsistency does not arise intentionally, but 
results from a lack of understanding about how the CFSP works and 
the lack of a central mechanism which with an overview of the 
different CFSP bodies. 
 
 
4.4 Other informal rules 
 
The existence of some domaines réservés has also been discussed in 
the CFSP literature. These are issues that are excluded from 
discussions at the EU level to avoid interference from the other 
countries. In the early years of the European foreign policy 
cooperation, these areas covered security issues such as nuclear 
status or neutrality and special relationships, like the US-UK 
‘special relationship’. Nonetheless, several authors pointed out that 
since the establishment of the CFSP there are a decreasing number 
of areas considered as domaines réservés (Smith, 2004; Whitman 
and Manners 2000) and that the CFSP discussions have gradually 
incorporated more issues, in particular, with the development of the 
ESDP. The fear with the enlargement was that the newcomers 
would bring their own domaines réservés, reducing the scope for 
negotiations. However, the empirical research has demonstrated that 
the tendency towards a decrease in these domaines réservés has not 
been substantially altered and that there has not been a tendency of 
‘ring-fencing’ by the new member states either.  
 
Finally, another practice that had to be learnt by the representatives 
of the new member states refers to the ‘agreed language’.  During 
the formal negotiations national representatives have to respect the 
language/policy agreed previously in the Council Conclusions and 
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some new member states breach this informal rule because they 
have not adopted it yet or just because of the lack of information. 
For instance, some of them do not have enough resources to deal in 
detail with every issue on the agenda. 
 
 
5.  The impact of enlargement on the role of “supranational 
actors” 
 
The enlargement has had an impact on the role played by the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the presidency in the 
CFSP working groups. In general, the enlargement has increased 
the relevance of these actors in the policy-making process. Since 
most of the new member states are small, they are more dependent 
on the information that they receive from the EU institutions. 
Therefore, the enlargement has put a lot of pressure on the 
Commission’s services that have to deal with twenty five states. 
Some national representatives, particularly from the small member 
states, have mentioned that it is now more difficult to meet with 
Commission’s officials. The same can be said for the Council 
Secretariat which has increased its responsibility as a coordinator. 
Its role in the CFSP should not be underestimated, in particular in 
those areas where the Policy Unit has been merged with the Council 
Secretariat DGs (for example in the Western Balkans or Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia), areas where the High Representative has 
also shown his personal commitment. Nowadays its role is more 
than mere secretariat since it is in charge of maintaining the 
institutional memory of the Council. With the enlargement, this 
tendency has been reinforced rather than altered. On the other hand, 
representatives from the new member states have pointed to the fact 
of understaffing in their departments and that this has therefore 
limited their actual impact on the policy-making process.   
 
In the case of the presidency of the Council, its ‘supranational’ 
character refers to the fact that it chairs the Council meetings (at all 
levels), has a decisive role in the agenda-setting and, acting as a 
primus inter pares, it should try to mediate a compromise among 
the different parties, before, during and after the meetings. The 
evidence demonstrates that this role is even more important, since 
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Diplomats generally agree that the effectiveness of the meetings, 
especially after the enlargement, is to a large extend conditioned by 
good presidency.  It is yet to be seen how the presidency will 
actually function when it becomes the turn of the new member 
states to hold it. However, the newcomers have still a long period 
ahead to prepare and they will be supported by the old member 
states in this task. 
 
6.  The adaptation of the new member state administrations to 
CFSP governance 
 
The role and everyday working practices of the MFAs in the new 
member states were also transformed as a result of their 
participation in the CFSP. The process is still taking place, but some 
common elements of the transformation and shared challenges can 
be singled out. One of them, noticed by a number of diplomats from 
old member states, is the relation between the capital and the 
representatives in Brussels. In most administrations the decision 
path is relatively long and the decisions are taken at quite a high 
level. Meanwhile, the CFSP requires its members to be reflective 
and quick in reacting to ongoing developments. In order to achieve 
this, it is argued that the experts should be given more flexibility 
and above all, be trusted by their capitals. One diplomat from one of 
the new member states believed that potential discrepancies 
between the capital and representatives in Brussels were among the 
greatest challenges to the adaptation process and saw his own role 
as that of “translating” the developments in the EU for the needs of 
the capital.   
 
This problem reflects the broader issue of differences in perceptions 
between the officials in Brussels and in the ministries back home. 
As the diplomats from the new member states seconded to Brussels 
discovered the rules of the game, their colleagues from the capitals 
still remained largely unaware how things worked at the EU level. 
Thus, the diplomats and MFA officials are embedded in two 
different environments. National representatives often speak of 
difficulties they have with explaining the code of conduct to their 
colleagues. This includes the differences of traditional bilateral 
relations, the significance of the lower levels of decision-making, 
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between the departments of the MFA, but also between various 
ministries. As an official from one new member state admitted: “we 
are aware that the European politics influences the whole spectrum 
of national policy, so we have to create it together”. Polish 
diplomats from the Department of European Union claimed that one 
of the main challenges was to convince their colleagues from the 
Ministry to work in a multilateral, rather than bilateral system.  In a 
similar manner, a diplomat from Hungary claimed: “you have to 
convince them that this is different from normal bilateral embassies 
work”.   
 
The national administrations are nonetheless slowly accepting the 
new modes of every-day-work, such as communication via e-mail 
or informal contacts between the experts. From this perspective, the 
CFSP has also contributed to the modernization processes in some 
of the MFAs. The number of experts dealing with the EU in 
different departments, and often also the state’s embassies, has 
increased dramatically. Within the ministries, the coordination 
mechanisms and the system of circulating documents had to be 
established. Moreover, the work cycle has been adjusted to mirror 
the EU meetings. Together with these organisational changes there 
has also been a change in how the Union as such was perceived. 
After the enlargement it could no longer be treated as an ‘alien’ 
organisation and that was reflected in a shift of discourse used for 
example in the instructions for the representatives in Brussels.   
 
In sum, the empirical evidence presented in this article has shown 
that the organizational culture and certain administrative obstacles 
have complicated learning. For example, the capitals initially did 
not recognize the fact that lower level bodies such as the working 
groups were the right place to resolve most of the issues. The new 
member states’ coordination systems are still undergoing a process 
of improvement. Habits of teamwork rather than competition 
between the ministries and foreign ministries’ departments are 
slowly emerging. The decision-making path appears to be too long. 
In addition, experts are not used to taking greater responsibility for 
the decisions. For its part, the process of information sharing has 
been a rather painful exercise. Moreover, the new member states’ 
representatives still do not seem to be given enough flexibility and 
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the implementation of all the lessons which might be drawn from 
the day-to-day operations of the Council bodies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Even though European foreign policy was initially seen as 
something which would clash with national policy, nowadays, many 
elites generally perceive the CFSP as an opportunity for, rather than 
a constraint upon national foreign policies, even in those areas of 
special interest. This favourable perception of the CFSP has 
facilitated processes of learning and socialisation undertaken by the 
new member states. Therefore, in the light of a general willingness 
to get actively involved in EU politics, more effort is put on 
promoting the national policy goals in the Council. In order to 
succeed in this strategy, they had to swiftly learn the rules of the 
game and apply them in every day work. Adaptation to the working 
procedures in the Council working groups requires the experience 
and the knowledge about ‘how things are done’ inside and outside 
the negotiation room, and this is not necessarily possessed by the 
newcomers.  
 
After a short period of initial adaptation, the majority of the new 
member states managed to learn the procedural rules of the working 
groups. The ‘active observers’ period played an important role in 
the learning process for both the EU and the new member states. It 
allowed the latter to participate in the working groups with prior 
experience and hence more confidence after enlargement. Still, 
while the formal and technical rules were relatively easy to grasp, 
the informal proceedings often remained a puzzle for them. It took 
time for the newcomers to realize how much was done on the 
corridors and via informal channels of communication. They also 
started to appreciate the importance of taking others’ views into 
account and the consensus-building practice. They learnt that 
national interests had to be reconciled with consensus within the 
group, and better strategies had to be developed to achieve that. 
Another major challenge was learning institutional interplay (i.e. 
between PSC, COREPER and the Council working groups), 
especially regarding the issue of maintaining horizontal and vertical 
consistency. 
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It seems that the enlargement has proved to be a challenge not only 
for the new member states and their administrations, but also for the 
EU itself. Contrary to some expectations, the enlargement did not 
disrupt the decision-making process in any substantial way, but it 
changed the dynamics within the working environment. The 
increase in the number of actors around the negotiating table had an 
impact on the way in which negotiations were conducted. However, 
it did not, as often predicted, produce deadlock. All parties managed 
to adjust to the changing environment. In order to facilitate 
agreements they shifted a substantial bulk of work from the official 
meeting room to the corridors. Consultations in the context of like-
minded groups increased. The code of conduct of the Council 
working groups was being strategically adapted by the newcomers, 
as they quickly understood that it would increase their chances of 
success. Nonetheless, there is a distinction to be drawn between 
having one’s voice heard in the working group and having it taken 
into account when decisions are being taken.  
 
The increase of informal contacts between diplomats may also have 
had an impact on the prevalent mode of interaction (deliberation, 
information, bargaining). Even though in the case of formal 
meetings, enlargement increased bargaining because of time 
constraints and the fact that there were more actors in the room; in 
the case of informal forums it has facilitated more deliberation. This 
is because in the latter case actors have more time, meetings are 
closed and they are conducted in a friendly atmosphere. Overall, it 
seems that the informal practices served as a way out of institutional 
deadlock and that the chances of getting an agreement remained 
unchanged. 
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